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Education and the new Europe 
At a conference held in  Paris  in  February  1970,  the  French  Minister  of Education  said 
he  considered  it  "paradoxical  that  at a  time  when  education  has  become  a  major  priority 
in  all  the  countries  of the  European  Community,  there  should  be  no  mention,  among  the 
projects  whose  implementation  can  be  planned  and  programmed  in  the  immediate  future, 
of a European  Educational  Community." 
M.  Guichard's  statement  reflects  the  fact  that  although  most  countries  now  consider 
education  a  priority  in  economic  and  social  development,  (and  this  national  recognition  is 
not contested at the  European  level),  very  little  in  the  way  of a Community policy  has  been 
spelt out. Such a situation obtains in  spite of the  fact  that  progress made  towards economic 
and  monetary  union  and  the  increasing  interdependence  of  the  member  states  already 
requires a degree  of co-ordination  of educational  policy  within  the  Community. 
The  situation  which  now  faces  education  requires  at 
least a  partial framework  of joint activity.  In quantitative 
terms alone the development of general education and the 
almost  total  elimination  of illiteracy  which  results  from 
lack of early  schooling  presents  tremendous  challenges  to 
the western nations. Thus the length of compulsory school-
ing  has  increased  considerably:  in  a  quarter of a  century 
it  has  risen  from  4-5  years  to  8  years  minimum  in  all 
the Community countries. The school attendance figures are 
close  to  100  per  cent in  five  of the  six  countries  in  the 
original  Community,  for  children  between  the  ages  of  7 
and 13.  The percentage is lower in Italy, particularly in the 
13 + age group. There is  still  headway to  be made:  in the 
United States in 1960, 80 per cent of the population between 
the  ages  of  14  and  18  was  in  full-time  education.  The 
same  percentage  was  reached  by  Japan  in  1964.  In  the 
Community only 40  per cent of the same  age  group-half 
the percentage-was similarly occupied in 1965. 
The  number  of  university  students  has  continued 
to  rise,  doubling  in  five  of  the  original  Six  (Luxem-
bourg  has  no  universities).  Between  1958  and  1968,  they 
numbered  over  one  and  a  half  million.  According  to  a 
survey  published  in  1969  by the Statistical  Bureau  of the 
Communities,  the  Six  could  in  1965  claim  30  million 
schoolchildren  and  students  in  full-time  education,  as 
against 25 million in 1958.  By  1970, the number had risen-to 
over  37  million  out of a  total  population  of 189  million 
(17.3  per cent of the whole.)  Between  1962  and 1970,  the 
school/student  population  of  the  Six  had  increased  by 
22.3  per cent as  against an increase of 7.4  per cent in the 
overall  population. 
There have been changes in other areas too. The develop-
ment of the  natural,  applied  and  social  sciences  is  daily 
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enlarging  the corpus of knowledge. It has become  a  com-
monplace  to say  that there  are  more  scholars  alive  today 
that the world has  seen in all its existence. It is difficult to 
estimate  the  precise  extent  of  the  progress  made  in  the 
last fifty  years,  but there can be no  doubt that this  is  an 
area of unparalleled growth: one discovery leads to another 
at  an  ever-increasing  pace.  If it  was  still  possible  until 
about  1930  for  a  university  graduate  to  survive  until  the 
end  of  his  professional  life  on  his  capital  of  acquired 
knowledge,  the  same  cannot be  said  today.  At  the  same 
time, methods of adding to the store of knowledge are being 
widely  developed.  It is  in  this  perspective  that  we  must 
view the increasingly important role of continuing education. 
Lastly,  the  increase  in  numbers  attending  school  and 
university,  the rise  in  the number of teachers,  the cost of 
school  building  and  equipment  have  appreciably  affected 
the  proportion  of  the  national  budget  devoted  to  educa-
tion in every country. At present, something like 7 per cent 
of the GNP and 17  to 20  per cent of public spending goes 
on  education.  It is  therefore  one  of the  major  items  in 
the  budgets  of the Community members.  In medium-range 
government planning, the trend towards the qualitative and 
quantitative  development  of  education  finds  further  con-
firmation,  but it  is  clear  that funds  are unlikely  to  con-
tinue increasing at the same rate:  the problem of financing 
this  expansion  will  have  to  be  considered. 
The limitations  of the  treaties 
In the face  of such  trends,  it must  immediately  be  re-
cognized that the treaties setting up the European Coal and Steel  Community  (1953),  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity and the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) 
contain  little  reference  to  educational  problems.  Although 
a  few  of the  articles  in the  treaties  have some  bearing on 
educational matters, these are usually of limited application. 
Article 9 of the Euratom treaty, for example, which looks 
forward to the creation of an "Institute of higher education" 
later  served  as  a  basis  for  discussion  of the establishment 
of a European university. The mutual recognition of qualifi-
cations  with  special  reference  to  the  right  of  exercising 
a  profession  (article  57  of the  Treaty  of Rome)  and  the 
provisions  for vocational training (art.  118  and 119  of the 
same  Treaty)  also  have  some  bearing  on  education. 
Article 56  of the ECSC treaty and article  125  of the EEC 
Treaty refer to the re-training of workers losing  their jobs 
as  a  result  of the  development  of the  Common  Market, 
or  made  redundant  by  technological  advance.  Article  41 
of  the  EEC Treaty looks  forward  to  the  coordination  of 
the vocational  training  schemes  in  the field  of agriculture. 
Some observers consider that the provisions of the treaties 
concerning the recognition of qualifications or the develop-
ment  of a  common  policy  on  vocational  training  are  in-
tended  merely  to  accompany  personal  mobility  and  the 
free exercise of professional activity within the Community, 
rather than to create a  genuine educational policy at Com-
munity  level.  Whether  such  a  policy  would  concern  itself 
with the structure of national education systems, the nature 
and content of the curriculum, or teaching methods, is  not 
clear.  However,  those  who  fear  that  implicit  in  the 
vague, well-meaning phrases 'harmonisation' and 'European 
educational policy' is the intention to rationalise, standardise 
or otherwise  bring  about changes  in  an area  hitherto  the 
preserve  of  national  authorities,  may  extract  some  reas-
surance from the fact that positive proposals so  far indicate 
that what is  envisaged  are  measures  to  facilitate  mobility, 
research,  and  exchange  of  information. 
At the summit meeting of heads of state and government 
held  in  Bonn  on  18th  July  1961,  the  Six  declared  their 
intention  of setting  up a  Council of the  ministers  respon-
sible  for educational  affairs  and  of creating,  among  other 
things,  a European University in  Florence.  But differences 
between  the  member  states  and the  obstacles  encountered 
hy  political  union  subsequently  pushed  these  discussions 
into  the  background.  Would  the  new  establishment  be 
linked  to  the  existing  Communities,  and  if  so  to  what 
extent?  The  ensuing  debate  on  the  connections  between 
educational  and institutional  questions  was  virtually never 
resolved. 
This  setback  has  not,  however,  prevented  certain  initia-
tives from seeing daylight in the course of the past fourteen 
years.  There  is  for  example  the  decision  to  encourage 
mobility  among scientific  personnel and cooperation in the 
sphere  of  post-secondary  education,  along  the  lines  of 
the brief given  on 31st  October 1967  to the PREST group 
('Policy  for  Scientific  and  Technical  Research').  Other 
initiatives  include  the intention to create and develop uni-
versity  courses  and  research  on  the  subject  of European 
integration. New perspectives were opened up at the Hague 
Conference of December 1969,  when the final  communique 
of the conference  referred  to  the  need  for  the 'European 
University' in Florence (point 11) and to the desirability of 
'associating  young  people  with  the  building  of  Europe' 
(point 16). 
The Commission  has  always  considered  that the pursuit 
of the economic  and social  objectives  of the  treaties  must 
inevitably take cognizance, sooner or later, of the develop-
ment  of  educational  policies  in  the  member  states.  The 
Commission  and the  European  Parliament have  not been 
alone  in  remarking  the  omission  of  specific  mention  of 
education  in  plans  for  European  integration.  During  the 
last  three  years,  several  lois-cadres  (outline  laws)  relating 
to the reform of higher education have been drafted within 
the  member  states:  they  all  recognize  that  exchange  and 
cooperation  between  universities  should  be  strongly  en-
couraged if the Community is ultimately to see  the removal 
of all obstacles to free  circulation. 
Strong support for this development came from the then 
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French Minister of Education,  Olivier Guichard, who  said 
in  a  speech  at  The  Hague  in  November  1969:  "The 
strengthening  of the  bonds  of  the  European  Community 
requires  that it should  not be confined to  the  administra-
tion  of  the  peoples  and  problems  of  today,  but  that  it 
take  steps  towards  building  a  common  future,  towards 
educating  and training  those  who  will  be  the  Europeans 
of tomorrow." This echoes  the statement made in Paris in 
February  1970,  quoted  at  the  outset,  during  which  the 
Minister went on to propose the setting up of a "European 
Centre  for  Educational  Development." 
The  European  Parliament  for  its  part  has  on  many 
occasions  since  1960  taken  the  initiative  of  presenting 
reports  on cultural matters, and in  particular on questions 
concerning  youth  and  education.  Among  these  could  be 
listed the many reports on the European university, M. Mer-
ten's  report  in  1966  on  the  European  schools  and  their 
development,  and  M.  Scarascia-Mugnozza's  report  in  the 
same  year  on  the  creation  of  a  European  Youth  Office. 
In  1969,  the European Parliament called for  more positive 
progress  towards  encouraging  mobility  among  teachers, 
researchers  and  students  (reports  by  MM.  Schuijt  and 
Hougardy)  and the problems of youth and education were 
again  the  subject  of  discussion  on  8th  February  1972 
(M.  Hougardy's report). 
At  the  suggestion  of  the  Belgian  government,  the 
Ministers  of Education  of the  member  states  met  for  the 
first  time  on  16th November  1971  to  examine  and  review 
together some of the problems of education. The direction 
taken by the Community in recent years and the prospects 
of future development led them to envisage  the possibility 
of a  common  European  educational  policy,  accompanied 
by  increased  cooperation  between  school  and  university 
systems. 
The  decisions  taken  at this  meeting  related  in  the  first 
place  to  the  establishment  of  a  European  University  at 
Florence,  and  the  further  study  of  the  French  proposal 
for  a  "European Centre of Educational  Development."  In 
addition,  the ministers  asked  the Committee of permanent 
representatives and the Commission to re-activate the talks 
already  under  way  concerning  the  mutual  recognition  of 
qualifications  with  a  view  to  introducing  the  right  to  the 
free exercise of professional activity within the Community. 
These declarations of intent indicate that the time seems 
ripe  for  the  introduction  of  a  policy  based  on  the  few 
concrete  provisions  contained in  the  Treaties  of Paris and 
Rome. As  M. Albert Borschette, a member of the Commis-
sion,  pointed  out  to  the  European  Parliament,  such  a 
policy  would  indeed  stand  at  the  limit  of  the  terms  of 
reference  of the Treaties, but not outside them altogether. 
It may be  added  that article  235  of the Treaty of Rome, 
the use of which has been authorized by the Paris Summit, 
might  be _invoked:  "If Community  action  should  appear 
necessary m  order to realize,  within  the functioning of the 
Common Market, one of the aims  of the Community in an 
area  for  which  this  treaty  has  not  specified  powers  of 
action, the Council of Ministers may, on the proposal of the 
Commission and after consultation of the Assembly, proceed 
by  an  unanimous  decision  to  make  the  appropriate  pro-
vision." 
The European university in Florence 
On  19th April 1972,  the Convention setting up a  "Euro-
pean Institute of Higher Education" was signed in Florence. 
The  three  new  members  of  the  Community  added  their 
signatures  to  his  Convention  shortly afterwards.  From the 
beginning of the academic year 1974-1975,  university grad-
uates from  all over the  world will be able to  pursue their 
studies and research within a specifically European context. 
Florence  will  thus  be  a  post-graduate  university,  and 
there  will  be  four  "departments":  history  and civilization; 
economics;  law;  and  social  and  political  science.  Com-
pared  with  some  of  the  earlier  schemes,  this  is  perhaps something  of a  disappointment.  But  it must also  be  seen 
as  a  positive  step  at a  time when  the Nine are seeking to 
lay  the  foundations  of  a  genuine  European  educational 
community.  In this  context  the  aim  of the  new  Institute 
might  be  summarized  as  follows:  to  contribute  to  the 
development of Europe's cultural and scientific  heritage in 
the perspective of European unity,  while at the same  time 
respecting its  diversity. 
Most  of  the  activities  of the  new  university  will  take 
the  form  of  seminars  and  group  research  projects.  The 
language  problem  was  a  particularly  delicate  question. 
It was  eventually  agreed that the  official  languages  of the 
Institute would be the four languages of the original Com-
munity (German, French, Italian and Dutch), plus English. 
At the beginning  of each seminar or project,  two  working 
languages  would  be chosen,  with  reference  to  the  origins 
of  both  teachers  and  students.  Those  students  who  have 
attended the  Institute for at least two  years and who  have 
completed  a  piece  of  original  research  will  be  eligible 
for  the title  of Doctor of the European  Institute  of Flo-
rence (in law, political science etc.) The Italian government 
has  acquired  the  Villa  Tolomei  with  a  park  of  about 
20  hectares  (about 50  acres)  where  it is  thought that 250 
students and researchers will  be accommodated in the first 
year and about 350 in three years from now.  Under certain 
circumstances,  students  will  qualify  for  maintenance 
grants. 
Three authorities will  be  responsible for the functioning 
of the  Institute's  academic  activities:  the  Higher  Council, 
composed  of  government  representatives  (responsible  for 
general  organization  and  functioning  of the Institute);  the 
President of the Institute,  appointed  for  a  period of three 
years;  and  the  Academic  Council  (responsible  for  matters 
of teaching  and research),  composed of the President,  the 
secretary-general, the heads of department, teachers attached 
to the Institute, and student representatives. 
Until 1977,  the Institute will  be financed  by intergovern-
mental contributions; from January 1978 it will  be financed 
from  sources  not  yet  determined.  (As  of  1975,  it  should 
be  remembered,  the  Community  budget  will  be  provided 
entirely  by  the  system  of self-financing  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty of April 1970.) 
On  the  occasion  of  the  signing  of  the  Convention  at 
Florence,  M.  Scarascia-Mugnozza, recently  appointed vice-
president  of  the  European  Commission,  remarked  with 
candour  and  realism  that  many  years  had  passed  since 
that far-off  day  in  Messina,  in  1956,  when  Italy had first 
proposed the idea of a  European university.  Nor could he 
avoid reminding  his  audience  that Florence was  the result 
of governmental rather than Community initiative,  despite 
the mood at the Hague when the heads of state and govern-
ment had declared that "the European Communities remain 
the  original  nucleus  from  which  European  unity  has 
developed  and taken :flight". 
The European Centre for Educational Development 
During  the  (1971)  meeting  which  led  to  the  establish-
ment of the European University,  the Ministers  of Educa-
tion examined the French proposals to set up a  European 
Centre  for  Educational  Development.  Their  aim  was  to 
formulate  a  European  educational  policy  which  would, 
while  respecting  the  diversity  of the  various  school  and 
university systems, encourage progress towards making them 
complementary, notably by increased specialisation of study 
and research. 
The  proposed  formula  for  this  centre  was  outlined  by 
M.  Olivier  Guichard  in  his  speech  at  The  Hague  on 
27th  November  1969.  "If Europe  has  become  a  Com-
munity  with  a  shared  future",  the  French  minister  em-
phasised,  "that  future  will  in  large  measure  depend  on 
what we  have  achieved-or  failed  to  achieve-in matters 
of culture  and  education."  And  since  the  policy  of eco-
nomic integration,  of which  one  of the basic  principles  is 
the  free  circulation  and  right  to  exercise  trades  or  pro-
fessions  within  the member states,  cannot proceed without 
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at least a minimum of coordination of training programmes, 
"a  European  educational  policy  is  clearly  essential,  since 
the  same  problems  are  shared  by  all  European  societies. 
By  studying  them  in  common,  we  are  more  likely  to 
provide  means  adequate  to  solve  them.  Joint  solutions 
would  prevent  our  paths  from  diverging  irremediably." 
The  tasks  of  the  proposed  centre  would  be  grouped 
round  four  basic  aims: 
1.  To disseminate information on the different European 
educational  systems.  At present  too  little  is  known  about 
them,  and  they  are  studied  only  in  an  uncoordinated 
fashion.  One  aim  of the Centre should  be to enlarge this 
knowledge,  to  store information systematically and distrib-
ute  it  widely,  particularly  in  certain  areas  commonly 
neglected:  the  economics  of  education  (comparability  of 
statistics,  systems  of  accounting  and  educational  costs); 
the  structures  and the  functioning  of educational  systems; 
educational research and experiment; the comparative study 
of the  typical  educational career  pattern  of young  people 
in the nine  member states.  Such  information, with  the aid 
of data banks' employing the latest techniques for collecting 
and  processing  information,  and  made  available  to  the 
relevant  corporate  bodies,  would  make  it  possible  for 
governments  to  make  improved decisions. 
2.  To  encourage  freedom  of  movement  among  both 
teachers  and  pupils,  by  the  elimination  of administrative 
obstacles to mobility in the teaching profession, and by the 
sucessful  implementation  of  multi-national  teaching  pro-
grammes.  Priority  should  be  given  to resolving  the  prob-
lems  raised  by  a  student's  fulfilment  of  several  periods 
of study in  different countries-in other words the recogni-
tion of the validity of periods of attendance at institutions 
in  the  member  states.  In  the  long  term  a  "European 
diploma"  might  be envisaged.  The  Centre  would  also  be 
expected to distribute information about employment vacan-
cies,  grants  etc.,  in  the  interests  of  increased  mobility 
within the Community. 
3.  To  encourage  cooperation  between  universities  in 
order  to  avoid  costly  duplication  of facilities,  and to  re-
commend  specialization  in  research.  The  centre  might 
encourage  scientific  cooperation  and  further  advanced 
research by the creation of a  European degree. 
4.  To promote cooperation  between  the different educa-
tional  systems,  with  particular  reference  to  the  develop-
ment  of  new  teaching  techniques  and  aids  (audio-visual 
equipment,  educational  television,  videotapes,  programmed 
learning  etc.)  to improve efficiency. 
The mutual recognition of qualifications 
The Treaty of Rome lays the foundation for the recogni-
tion  of degrees,  certificates  and  other qualifications  in  the 
context of removing  obstacles  to  the  free  exercise  of pro-
fessions  within  the  Community.  The  Commission  has 
already put a number of proposals to the Council, in appli-
cation of article  57,  concerning in particular the following 
professions:  architect, engineer,  doctor,  dentist,  pharmacist, 
veterinary surgeon and economist. 
Once  adopted, such directives  would  become binding on 
member  states:  they  would  have  to  modify  their  existing 
legislation  in  order  to  recognize  the  qualifications  issued 
by  other  Community  states  and  if  necessary  in  order  to 
adapt their own  training  procedures if they should fail to 
conform  to  the  directives. 
Broadly speaking, the proposals submitted to the Council 
suggest that in  every discipline, minimum criteria for train-
ing  should  be  defined  wherever  vocational  training  is  a 
condition  of  entry  to  a  profession  or  of  obtaining  a 
qualification.  The  aim  of  the  proposal  is  not  therefore 
to  pronounce  on the relative  value  of the  different  train-
ing  schemes:  by specifying  minimum  criteria,  the  member 
states would merely  be obtaining  the  necessary  guarantees 
for  the effective  implementation of the  right to  exercise  a 
profession  anywhere  within  the  Community. In  discussions  on  the  harmonisation  of  qualifications, 
"academic"  recognition  should  not  be  confused  with  the 
"professional"  recognition  which  may  be  a  condition  to 
entry to  professional practice.  Academic recognition would 
apply  essentially  within  universities.  It  would  enable  a 
student  to  continue  his  or  her  education  in  a  different 
country and to be enrolled in a  course  at a  level  decided 
by  the  competent  authority.  The  proposed  Centre  for 
Educational  Development might  provide  a  suitable  setting 
within  which  the modalities of legislation  to  increase  such 
mobility  among  students  might  be  studied. 
Training and mobility:  other initiatives 
The Commission is  at present engaged upon the elabora-
tion  of  a  Community  working  programme  on  vocational 
training, under articles 118 and 128 of the Treaty of Rome. 
On 26th July 1971,  the Council  of Ministers approved the 
guidelines for this project; they were subsequently published 
in  the  Official  Gazette  of 12th  August  1971  which  states 
that:  "economic, social,  technical  and educational develop-
ment  in  the  member  states  has  led  those  responsible ... 
to consider the development of educational systems and of 
measures  of vocational  guidance  and  training  adapted  to 
the  aspirations  and  abilities  of  the  workers,  having  due 
regard  to  the  patterns  of available  employment." 
Under  the  aegis  of  the  Committee  for  medium-term 
economic  policy,  the  experts,  called  upon  to  examine 
cooperation  among  the  member  states  on  matters  of 
scientific and technical policy (the PREST group), have set 
up several specialized working  parties in order to  examine 
ways  of  providing  coordinated  training  programmes  and 
the  exchange  of  scientists  among  the  member  states: 
(a)  post-graduate  education;  (b)  exchange  and mobility  of 
scientists;  (c)  training in computer techniques.  On the first 
two  questions,  the  working  parties  have  already  reported 
back  to  the Council;  their  conclusions  on the  third  have 
not yet been received. 
European schools 
In 1953,  after the European Coal  and Steel  Community 
had set up its  headquarters in Luxemburg, a small primary 
school was  opened.  Originally organized by  the parents of 
the  pupils,  it  received  official  status,  sanctioned  by  the 
Six,  on  12th  April  1957.  On  15th  July of the same  year, 
the regulations  governing  the European  baccalaureat  were 
signed.  In  1958,  the  second  European  school  opened  in 
Brussels,  soon  to  be followed  by  four  similar  schools  in 
Mol  (1960),  Varese  (1960),  Karlsruhe  (1962)  and  Bergen 
(1963). 
The  content  of  the  European  schools  syllabus  was 
very close to that of each national syllabus.  But classes in 
literature, history and geography in particular were enriched 
by  contributions  from  each  nation.  Bearing  in  mind  the 
attachment  of  each  of  our  countries  to  its  educational 
traditions,  one cannot help  but be pleasantly  surprised by 
the  rapidity  with  which  the  political  and  educational 
authorities  of  the  time,  unanimously  eager  to  make  the 
venture a success, reached agreement on a common syllabus 
and on the principles of a  European education. 
Basic instruction is given in the four official languages of 
the Six:  German, French,  Italian  and  Dutch.  English  and 
Danish  are  to  be  introduced  shortly  as  a  consequence 
of the enlarging  of the Communities. The continued  priv-
ileged  position  of  each  pupil's  mother  tongue  is  thus 
assured. 
In order  to  promote unity  within  the  school  and social 
encounters  between  the  different  linguistic  groups,  some 
subjects are taught in common to classes of the same level. 
In  the  primary  school,  such  courses  take  the  form  of 
"European hours", at secondary level common courses  are 
taught  in  the  "working  languages",  German  and  French. 
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Particular efforts  are  made  to  give  the  pupils  a  thorough 
knowledge  of modern languages  and besides  the "working 
language"  all  pupils  have  compulsory  tuition  in  English 
from  the  third  year in the  secondary  school. 
The  instruction  and  education  given  at  the  European 
schools  respect  the  conscience  and  convictions  of  the 
individual.  Curriculum  and  timetable  include  hours  set 
aside  for either religious  or moral education. 
At present,  about 8,000  pupils  attend European schools 
and  1,427  school  leavers  have  received  the  "European 
graduation  certificate"  which  qualifies  them  for  entry  to 
any  university  within  the  original  Community,  as  well  as 
to  those  of Austria, and in certain circumstances  those  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  Switzerland  and  the  United  States. 
To appreciate the proper significance of this certificate, one 
should  bear  in  mind  that  the  European  schools  were  set 
up by an international agreement which placed them under 
the  authority  of  a  Higher  Council  composed  of  the  six 
ministers  of education.  The  status  and  syllabuses  of the 
schools  were  formulated and adapted  by  the  same Higher 
Council. They therefore represent a synthesis and harmonisa-
tion  of primary  and  secondary  syllabuses  within  the  Six, 
proving  that  the  latter  were  by  no  means  irreconcilably 
divided. 
Several  ministers  have  already  expressed  the  opinion 
that the experience  gained  in the European schools  could 
well  be extended-for instance  by establishing other Euro-
pean  schools  in  large  cities  whose  population  includes 
residents  of several  nationalities.  It would  be one way  of 
tackling the problem of providing schooling for children of 
immigrant workers and the way would be prepared for the 
eventual  harmonisation  of  teaching  syllabuses  within  the 
entire Community. 
The Community as  a subject of study and research 
The  'European  University'  in  Florence  will  provide  a 
particularly  appropriate  setting  for  European  studies.  But 
even now, following the precedent of the College of Europe 
at Bruges,  about fifteen  Institutes or University Centres of 
European  Studies  are  active  within  the  original  member 
countries of the Community as  well  as in other European 
countries.  Moreover,  since  1965,  the  study  of Community 
law,  common  policies,  and  foreign  relations  of the  Com-
munities have figured on the syllabuses of most faculties  of 
law,  economics  and  political  science  within  the  original 
member  states  as  well  as  in many universities  outside  the 
Community, including eastern countries, the USA,  Canada, 
Japan,  etc. 
The  Community  institutions  are  in  contact  with  about 
a hundred reference libraries and over 180 centres of Euro-
pean  documentation  which  they  have  helped  to  create 
within certain universities and which  provide the necessary 
infrastructure for the development of the teaching and com-
plementary  research.  In  the  academic  year  1970-1971  for 
instance,  the European Community Institute for University 
Studies had registered over 1,300  doc~oral theses on various 
aspects  of European integration. The development of such 
studies  cannot but increase  contacts  between  teachers  and 
researchers and create the embryo of a European University 
Community. 
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United States policy 
towards postwar Western Europe 
As his second term as President of the  United States drew  to  a close,  George Washington 
delivered  his Farewell  Address to  the  American people,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  principles 
he  believed  should  guide  future  policies.  In  speaking  of the  United  States'  relations  with 
Europe,  he  stated:  'Europe  has  a  set of primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none  or  a  very 
remote relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of which 
are  essentially foreign  to  our concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it must be  unwise in us to  implicate 
ourselves by artificial ties  in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics ... Why,  by interweaving 
our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the 
toils of European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice?  It  is  our  true  policy  to 
steer  clear  of permanent  alliances.' 
For almost  one  hundred  and fifty  years  this  'avoidance 
of  entangling  alliances',  as  subsequently  formulated  by 
Jefferson,  served  as  the basis  of American  policy  towards 
Europe. When basic American interests were threatened, as 
in  the  First  World  War,  the  United  States  was  forced 
to intervene in European affairs, but such  departures  from 
the  policy  of  non-involvement  were  temporary:  as  soon 
as  the  danger  had  subsided,  the  United  States  attempted 
to extricate itsef from political developments  on the Euro-
pean  continent,  as  is  illustrated  most  graphically  by  the 
Senate's  refusal  to ratify the  Versailles  Treaty,  which  was 
regarded  as  imposing  worldwide  commitments  on  the 
United States. Yet only twenty-five years after the American 
Expeditionary  Forces had  been  sent to  France the United 
States  was  once  again  embroiled  in  a  European  conflict, 
and this time one of the first casualties was to be the policy 
of  non-involvement  in  Europe. 
The  general  form  of the  United  States'  relations  with 
postwar  Europe  was  therefore  determined  by  decisions 
made during the early  1940's.  These constituted a  crucial 
departure  in  American  foreign  policy:  the  United  States 
having  twice  in  less  than  thirty  years  become  involved 
in  European  conflicts,  it was  no  longer  possible  to  argue 
that  European  affairs  were  of  no  concern  to  the  United 
States.  Rather,  it  was  deemed  necessary  that  the  United 
States  play  an  active  part  in  European  affairs  so  as  to 
protect  its  interests  and  especially  to  prevent  the  out-
break  of  yet  another catastrophic  war.  To  the  wartime 
leaders  it was  clear  that changes  in the nature of warfare 
and  of international  trade  meant  that  the  United  States 
could  no  longer  remain  aloof  from  European  develop-
ments.  The  rapid  spread  of  conflicts  throughout  the 
world and the emergence of an interdependent world eco-
nomy,  in  which  the  United States'  prosperity  was  tied  to 
that of Europe, made this impossible. 
On  this  increasing  willingness  of  the  United  States  to 
assume  a  major  role  in  international  affairs  was  super-
imposed a  growing  disillusionment  with  the Soviet Union. 
As  more and more of Eastern Europe came under Russian 
control,  the  original  goal  of  preventing  future  outbreaks 
of armed  conflict  was  supplemented  and  eventually  over-
shadowed by that of stopping Soviet expansion into West-
ern  Europe,  whose  continued  independence  was  regarded 
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as  vital  to that of the United States itself.  These goals  are 
evident  in  the  three  basic  tenets  of  postwar  American 
policy  in Europe.  First,  a  strong  and  democratic  western 
Europe  is  in  the  interests  of the  United States.  Although 
it  was  not  expected  that  European  and  American  views 
would be identical on all issues,  it was  believed  that their 
shared commitment to democratic ideals and their common 
concern  about  Soviet  influence  would  be  the  basis  of  a 
fundamental  community  of  interest.  It  was  consequently 
desirable  that western  Europe  be  strong in  order to with-
stand  possible  Communist aggression  and to  contribute to 
the  might  of  what  was  to  become  the  western  alliance.  r-
Second,  the  creation  of  a  united  Europe  was  to  be 
encouraged  as  a  means  of  achieving  this  first  objective. 
National  obstacles  to  trade  were  regarded  as  inimical  to 
the  recovery  and  subsequent  growth  of  the  European  , 
economy,  and  only  as  an  integrated  unit  could  western 
Europe  wield  the  political  power  that_  would  end  its 
dependence  on  the United States.  Moreover,  the  existence 
of a  united  Europe would preclude  future  armed  conflicts 
among  its  members,  notably  France  and  Germany;  and, 
of course,  the establishment of a  United States of Europe 
had  a  certain  emotional  appeal.  Third,  the  United  States 
should  sacrifice  its  short-term  economic  interests  to  the 
longer-range  \political  goal.  In  the  immediate  postwar 
period,  of course,  the  United States  enjoyed a  balance  of 
payments surplus that would have minimised the difficulties 
caused  by  discrimination  against  American  manufactures, 
but  even  after  this  situation  changed  the  United  States 
viewed  the  creation  of a  strong,  united,  democratic  west-
ern  Europe  as  justifying  transient  commercial  losses. 
Moreover, it was  assumed  that these  reductions  in exports 
would  be  attenuated  by  the  rapid  economic  expansion 
resulting  from  economic  union. 
Although the containment of communism came to over-
shadow  the  other  motives  for  American  involvement  in 
European  affairs,  United  States  policy  towards  western 
Europe since  1945  shows  a  remarkable  constancy  of pur-
pose  and  conduct.  The  concrete  manifestations  changed 
with  circumstances  and  were  adapted  to  particular  situa-
tions,  but  the  basic  principles  and  tenets  remained 
unaltered. Postwar recovery 
With the cessation of hostilities in 1945  the United States 
terminated  the  assistance  to  its  allie;  that  had  been 
provided under the Lend-Lease  Program.  Aid for  refugees 
continued  to  be  available  through  the  United  Nations 
Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration  and  for  the 
occupied  territories  of  Italy  and  Germany  th~ough  the 
military  administrations,  but  the  other  western  European 
countries  were  obliged  to  apply  for  loans.  Yet  even  the 
$3,750  million  loan  to  the  United  Kingdom  failed  to 
resolve  the  severe  economic  difficulties.  The  war  had 
destroye? much of the iD:dustrial  plant of western  Europe, 
and  agricultural  productiOn  was  down  to  a  fraction  of 
pre-war  levels;  consequently,  manufactured  goods  were 
scarce and the limited supplies of food had to be rationed. 
Clearly  the  situation  was  ripe  for  exploitation  by  com-
munist  agitators.  But  it would  not  have  been  enough  to 
merely  satisfy  Europe's  current  requirements·  rather  the 
reconstitution  of European productive capacitY  was  r:eces-
sary. 
The  Marshall  Plan  responded  to  these  twin  needs.  As 
advanced  by  Secretary  of State  Marshall in  June  1947,  it 
was  to attempt to alleviate suffering and prevent starvation 
to restore the economic health that would provide the best 
defence  against  communist  subversion,  and  to  revive 
national  economies  so  that recurring  assistance  would not 
be necessary.  Yet while  the  United  States  was  to  provide 
the  major part of the aid,  the administration  of the  Mar-
shall Plan was  to  be European and  the  aid  provided was 
to be based on the request submitted by a  European com-
mittee  that  co-ordinated  the  various  national  proposals. 
Further,  cooperation  among  the  European  participants 
was  made  a  precondition  for  American  assistance:  to 
facilitate  the  expansion  of  intra-European  commerce, 
barriers  to  trade  were  reduced  and  organisations  such  as 
the European Payments  Union and the OEEC established. 
The  Marshall  Plan  may  not  have  resulted  in  economic 
integration,  but  it  did  make  the  economic  recovery  of 
Europe possible  and furnished  one  of the  earliest  oppor-
tunities  for  national  governments  to  work  together  to 
solve  common  European  problems. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was the military 
counterpart  of  the  Marshall  Plan.  In  response  to  the 
proposal  of the  five  signatory  states  of the  Brussels  Pact 
(Britain,  France,  and  the  Benelux)  to  form  a  defensive 
alliance  including the  United States,  the American govern-
ment  supported  the  establishment  of  NATO  in  1949 
although it again  insisted  that the alliance be multilateral: 
rather than a  series  of bilateral commitments.  While  only 
a  minority  in  the  State  Department  subscribed  to  the 
'twin  pillars'  concept,  in  which  the  United  States  and 
Europe constituted two separate and equal bases  on which 
the alliance was  founded, there was  an attempt to structure 
the  organisation  so  that  the  United  States  and  Europe 
could  participate  as  equals.  In  practice,  of  course,  the 
United  States  has  predominated  because  of  its  prepon-
derant  military  strength;  nevertheless,  while  recognising 
the importance of NATO as a  symbol of American invol-
vement  in  and commitment to Europe,  it has  consistently 
been American policy to try to increase the role played by 
the European states,  in terms  of both decision-making and 
responsibilities. 
Steps  towards  European  unity 
Despite the progress  achieved towards European integra-
tion under the aegis  of the United States and through the 
creation  of such  international  organisations  as  OEEC and 
NATO,  it was  obvious  that if European unity  was  to  be 
attained,  the  initiative  would  have  to  be  taken  by  the 
Europeans  themselves.  Thus,  on  May  9,  1950,  Robert 
Schuman,  then  Foreign  Minister  of France,  proposed  the 
creation  of  a  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  that 
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would pool the industries of the member countries under a 
single  authority.  Although statements issued by the United 
States  were  deliberately  circumspect  to  avoid  the  appear-
~nce of pressuring European nations, it welcomed  'a most 
Important development  prompted by the desire  to  further 
"a  rapprochement  between  Germany  and  France  and 
progress  towards  the  economic  integration  of  western 
Europe", objectives favoured by the United States Govern-
ment'.1 The Schuman Plan was not only gratifying evidence 
that the  limited steps  taken with  American  encouragement 
had borne fruit; it also constituted a great advance towards 
the two major goals of American policy. The establishment 
of such a community would make war between its members 
unthinkable and materially impossible and would facilitate 
German .entry into the community of nations;  moreover, it 
se~med likely to engender further steps leading to European 
umon. 
Yet  if the  American  policy  towards  the  Schuman  Plan 
~aY: generally  b~ described as discreet support, there were 
significant exceptions. The proposed ECSC was  attacked by 
bot~ . c<;mservatives  a~d  ~teet  producers  as  dangerously 
socialistic,  although this  viewpoint found  few  adherents in 
the  government.  The plan's  more  ardent proponents  tried 
to  manreuvre  the  United  States  into  taking  a  more  open 
stand:  when  the  United  Kingdom  decided  against  joining 
the  ECSC,  several  members  of  Congress  demanded  that 
Marshall Aid funds to Britain be curtailed. Although there 
was  considerable  feeling  that  British  membership  was 
desirable both for Britain and for the ECSC, the American 
gove~ent  wisely abstained from intervention. In contrast, 
the  Umted States  openly  demonstrated  its  support for the 
Coal  and  Steel  Community  once  it  came  into  existence 
~y being one of ~he first  nations to  extend official  recogni-
tion and by offermg an enormous loan, for which the sole 
justification  was  political approbation. 
That the Schuman Plan came  to a  successful  conclusion 
reflected the general coincidence of American and European 
P?licies. The potentially disastrous consequences when these 
diverged were demonstrated by the history of the European 
Defence Community. With the outbreak of the Korean War 
in  1950,  the  United  States  became increasingly  concerned 
about  troop  strength  in  Europe,  where  it  feared  an 
attack would materialize. It became American policy there-
fore to  press  not only for  the fulfilment  of NATO quotas 
but  also  for  the  rearmament  of  western  Germany.  The 
spectre of a remilitarized Germany understandably disturbed 
many European  governments,  particularly  that of France. 
As  an  alternative  to  the  unilateral  rearmament  of  Ger-
many,  the  French government proposed  the  creation  of a 
European  Defence  Community,  in  which  the  members 
would jointly control all the forces.  After prolonged nego-
tiations,  the  six  members  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Com-
munity signed a treaty establishing the EDC in May, 1952. 
The  United  States  government  was  a  strong  overt 
advoc~te of the EDC,  which  it regarded  as  necessary  for 
rearmmg  Germany  and  completing  the  readmission  of 
that  country  to  the  community  of  European  nations. 
EDC  also  elicited  American  support  because  it  would 
constitute  a  powerful  military  force  counter-balancing  the 
Soviet forces and would almost certainly necessitate further 
progress  towards  political  unification.  The  efforts  of  the 
United States to promote the defence community were inten-
sified  in  1953,  indicating  concern  over  the  slow  progress 
and culminated in Secretary of State Dulles's blatant threat 
that an "agonizing reappraisal" of American commitments 
in Europe would be necessary if the treaty were not ratified. 
Whether  such  statements  were  counterproductive  or  as 
appears most likely in the case of France, were simply' not 
believed,  the  treaty  failed  to  achieve  ratification.  Sub-
sequently,  as  the  result  of enormous  American  pressure. 
West Germany was  admitted  as  a  full  member to NATO 
and  the  Western  European  Union  (an  expanded  Brussels 
Pact),  but  the  resort  to  coercion  soured  United  States 
relations  with  France  for  several  years  thereafter. 
1  Dean  ACHESON,  Present  at  the  Creation,  London,  Hamish 
Hamilton, pp.  385-386. The EEC and Euratom 
The  proposals  to  establish  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  Euratom  were,  in  contrast,  of European 
origin.  The  foreign  ministers  of  the  six  members  of  the 
Coal  and  Steel  Community,  meeting  in  Messina  in  1952, 
took  the  initiative  to  relaunch  the  integration  movement. 
Throughout the negotiations among the six in Brussels the 
following  year,  the  United  States  refrained  from  active 
involvement,  although it indicated  its  general  endorsement 
of the project. That progress towards European unification 
was  once  again  being  made  elicited  approval  from 
Washington,  but official  statements were circumspect,  both 
because  of  the  unfortunate  consequences  of active  inter-
vention in the case of the EDC and because of the vague 
nature of the initial proposals. The creation of a  common 
market  could  constitute  a  big  step  forward  on  the  road 
to  political  integration,  but  it  could  also  result  in  the 
emergence  of regional  trading  blocs,  to  which  the  United 
States-as the champion of a global, multilateral economic 
system-was  opposed.  The  final  American  judgement 
would  therefore  have  to  depend  on the  balance  between 
supranationalism and protectionism embodied in the EEC. 
Similarly, the creation of a  common energy authority could 
contribute  to  the  realisation  of  a  united  Europe,  but  it 
could  also  engender  a  dangerous  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  Europe.  Once  again,  the  American  position 
would  have  to  be  determined  by  the  nature  of the  pro-
posals  presented  by  the Spaak Committee. 2 
Mter careful  consideration,  the  United  States  endorsed 
the  proposals  of  the  Spaak  Committee,  although  there 
was  some  apprehension  about  their  potential  for  causing 
dislocations  in  US-European  trade.  Of  much  greater 
concern  to  American  officials,  however,  was  the  fact  that 
the  EEC  was  to  comprise  only  the  six  members  of  the 
Coal and Steel  Community.  The creation of the Common 
Market  could  therefore  conceivably  lead  to  the  division 
of  western  Europe  on  economic  grounds.  And  if  these 
six  were  to  proceed  towards  political  union,  this  cleavage 
might  be  intensified  and  introduce  a  serious  split.  The 
restricted  membership  of  the  EEC  caused  particular  dis-
quietude  in  the  United  States  because  it  was  generally 
believed  that  Britain,  with  its  strong  heritage  of  stable 
and democratic government,  was  an indispensable member 
of any  European  political  community.  The  United  King-
dom  was,  however,  clearly  unwilling  to  surrender  its 
sovereignty  in  certain  areas  to  the  institutions  of  the 
Community  as  was  demanded  by  the  Treaties  of  Rome, 
and the  United  States  was  equally averse  to applying  any 
pressure.  The  dilemma  facing  the  American  government 
was  therefore  whether  to  encourage  the  Six  to  proceed 
without  Britain  or  to  attempt  to  foster  an agreement  be-
tween  the Six  and the  other European states  that seemed 
almost certain to preclude political union for the foreseeable 
future. 
The  United  States  was  compelled  to  face  this  question 
when  the  British  government  proposed  the  creation  of  a 
free  trade area encompassing all of western Europe, inside 
which  the  Six  would  proceed  alone  to  economic  union. 
The American reaction to the Maudling Plan was decidedly 
negative,  for it would have created the very regional  trad-
ing  blocs  to  which  the  United  States  was  opposed  and 
would  have  caused  significant  trade  dislocations  without 
the  mitigating  benefits  of progress  towards  political unio!l. 
Moreover  it  was  all  too  likely  that  the  plan  would  m 
practice destroy the EEC, as the incentives for its members 
to  create  an  economic  union  would  be  greatly  reduced. 
2  At  a  meeting  at  Messina  in  June  1955,  the  foreign  ministers .of 
the  countries  belonging  to  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Commumty 
decided  that  future  efforts  for  the  unification  of  Europe  should  be 
concentrated  on the economic field.  Two important plans emerged:  that 
for  Euratom,  the  European atomic energy  pool, and.  that for a  common 
market.  A group of experts was  appointed  to determme. ways  a~d me~ 
of achieving  these goals.  M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the.  Belgian F<?reign  ~m­
ister  presided  over  this  intergovernmental  comrmttee  and  Its  findings 
-th~  Spaak  Report-were  submitted  to  the  foreign  ministers  on 
21st.  April  1956.  'Rapport  des  chefs  de  delegation  aux  Ministres  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres',  135  pp.,  Brussels,  1956. 
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The  six  members  of  the  ECSC  therefore  received  firm 
American support in opposing the Maudling Plan and con-
sequently  in  establishing  their  common  market.  Although 
the  EEC's  potential  to  economically  divide  the  continent 
concerned  the  United  States,  it  was  indisputably  a  con-
tribution  to  the creation of a  politically and economically 
united  Europe that was  after  all  the ultimate goal.  More-
over,  the  British  interest  in  maintaining  commercial 
ties  with  western  Europe, as  demonstrated  by  their desire 
for  a  free  trade  area,  suggested  that  it  was  not  entirely 
inconceivable that the United Kingdom might one day join 
with  the Six and hence end the split that became manifest 
with the formation of the European Free Trade Association 
by  seven  states  unable  to  subscribe  to  the  EEC. 
An enlarged Community 
Thus while the United States  regarded the abandonment 
of  progress  towards  political  unification  as  too  high  a 
price  to  pay  for  British  membership  of the  EEC,  it felt 
that  British  participation  was  desirable  as  it  would  not 
only  strengthen  the  Community,  but  it  would  end  the 
division of western Europe into two  economic blocs.  Also, 
British  membership  was  indispensable  for  the  strong  and 
united Europe President Kennedy envisaged in his "Grand 
Design": 
"We  believe  that  a  united  Europe  will  be  capable  of 
playing a  greater role in the common defense,  of ~espond­
ing  more  generously  to  the  needs  of  p~orer  na~ons, of 
joining with the  United States and others m  lowermg  t~~de 
barriers,  resolving  problems of currency and  commoditi~s, 
and developing coordinated policies  in all other economic, 
diplomatic, and political areas ... It would be premature, at 
this time, to more than indicate the high regard with which 
we  would view  the formation of this partnership. The first 
order of business  is  for  our European  friends  to  go  for-
ward in forming the more perfect union which will someday 
make it possible." 3  .  . 
If therefore  the  United States  was  determined  to  avmd 
the  overt  intervention  that  had  produced  such  damaging 
results with the EDC, it nevertheless clearly supported and 
encouraged  the  1961  British  application  for  membership 
to the EEC on the terms of the Treaties of Rome. In addi-
tion  to  public  and  private  indications  of its  ~nd?rsem~nt 
of the  bid,  the  United States  dangled a  matenal mcentlve 
before Europe:  the Trade ExpansiOn  Act of !962  g~ve the 
President  the  authority  to  completely  abolish  tanffs  on 
items  where  the  United  States  and  the  EEC  accounted 
for more than eighty per cent of the world's trade-an offer 
that  would  be  meaningful  only  if  Great  Britain  were  a 
member of the Community. 
The  United States  also  tried to  improve the chances of 
British admission  by  coming  to  the aid of Prime Minister 
Macmillan's  government,  which  was  comi?g  under  h~3:vy 
fire  in December,  1962,  after the  cancellation of _the  JOmt 
Anglo-American Skybolt project because of escalating c~sts. 
This threatened to deprive the United Kingdom of a crediJ:'le 
nuclear  deterrent.  Although  the  British  government  mam-
tained  that the United States was  obliged under the terms 
of the agreement to provide a~  alter1_1a~ive 'Yeapons  ~ystem, 
the American decision  to furnish Bntam with Polans war-
heads  reflected  primarily  a  sense  of personal  commitm~nt 
by  the  President and a  fear  that should  the  Conserv~~ve 
government  fall  over  this  issue,  the  prospects  for  Bntish 
entry  would  be  dim.  To  de  G~ulle, how:,ver, _the  Na~sau 
accord was  the epitome of prec1sely  that  special  relation-
ship" between Britain  ~nd the  Unite~  ~tates that he asse!t-
ed was  incompatible with membership m  the EEC. Despite 
the  offer  of identical  assistance  to  the  French,  de  Gaulle 
seized  upon  the  agreement  as  the  pretext for  his  veto  of 
the British application in January,  1963. 
While  de  Gaulle's  veto  conclusively  demonstrated  ~at 
British  membership  in  the  EEC  would  not  be  a  reality 
during  his  term  in  office,  it  was  hoped  that  the  French 
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Bruges,  College  of Europe,  pp.  98-99. attitude  might  in  time  soften  so  that  the  enlargement  of 
the Community might be possible. This optimistic assump-
tion  and the  realistic  perception  that little  could  be done 
to  change de  Gaulle's  policies  resulted in  the emphasis  in 
American policy shifting from the growth and development 
of the EEC to  the relationship  between  the United  States 
and the Community. With the passage  of time,  the United 
States became increasingly dismayed by the lack of progress 
towards political union, especially as  the sacrifices it believ-
ed it was  making came at a  period of economic difficulty. 
By  the end of the 1960's,  the view  of the European Com-
munity as a protectionist trading bloc, discriminating against 
American products and concluding preferential trade agree-
ments that kept American manufactures out of part of the 
developing  world,  was  gaining  currency.  While  this  view 
seems exaggerated, it illustrates the magnitude of the changes 
that had occurred in ten years. The EEC was now a reality, 
with  its  own  interests,  not always  identical  with  those  of 
the  United  States.  Although  American  disillusionment 
with the Community is  to some extent responsible  for the 
emergence  of disputes  between  the  United  States  and the 
EEC,  many  of the  conflicts  merely  signify  that the Com-
munity as a  distinct entity has now come of age. 
Relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  EEC 
While  recognizing  that  the  formation  of  the  Common 
Market would entail certain economic sacrifices and accept-
ing these losses  as  the price of achieving a  united Europe, 
the  United  States  has  endeavoured  to  minimize  these 
adverse  effects,  particularly  as  progress  towards  political 
union  slowed  and  the  American  balance  of  payments 
worsened.  The  creation  of  an  economic  union  inev-
itably  tends  to  both  increase  and  divert  trade  as  the 
removal  of  tariff  barriers  acts  to  stimulate  commerce 
among the members while discouraging imports from third 
countries  by making  them  relatively  more  expensive.  The 
United  States  has  therefore  tried  to  reinforce  the  trade-
creating  tendency  by  advocating  the  reduction  and  elim-
ination  of intra-European  obstacles  to  trade.  This  would 
not only  strengthen  the  bonds  between  the  members  but 
also  foster  a  dynamic  economy,  and  ensure  that  growth 
did  not  occur  at  the  expense  of  non-members.  It  has 
therefore  encouraged  the  Community  to  adopt  a  liberal 
external  trading  policy  so  as  to  lessen  the  trade-diverting 
effects  caused  by  imports from  outside  being  displaced  by 
competition from  member states  and so  that the Common 
Market can contribute  to  the emergence  of a  truly  multi-
lateral  world  economy,  rather  than  foster  one  dominated 
by regional  trading  blocs. Since  the EEC has  succeeded in 
removing most of the internal barriers to trade, the conflicts 
between the Community and the United States focus largely 
on the extent to which the former is  following protectionist 
policies. 
According  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade, which  embodies  the  principles governing  commerce 
in most of the non-Communist world,  the  common  set of 
tariffs  adopted  by  a  customs  union  must  not  on  average 
be  higher  than  those prevailing in  the  member  states  pre-
viously.  Moreover,  any non-member  that can  demonstrate 
that its  trade has been adversely affected by the formation 
of  the  union  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  its  losses. 
Although  the  common  external  tariff  of  the  EEC  is  in 
accordance  with  the first  provision  of GAIT, the  United 
States  and  other  nations  could  nevertheless  show  that 
because,  for  example,  German  manufactures  could  now 
enter  France  duty-free,  their  own  exports  were  suffering 
from  relative  discrimination.  Consequently  a  substantial 
part of the Dillon Round of GATT talks in 1961-1962 was 
devoted  to  assessing  the  effects  of  the  establishment  of 
the EEC on trade patterns. In the event,  the six  members 
of the  Common  Market declined to make any appreciable 
compensation  but  did  offer  to  reduce  the  level  of  the 
external  tariff  by  twenty  percent  if the  other  members  of 
GATT  reciprocated.  On  the  basis  of  this  proposal~  the 
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Dillon  Round came to  a  mildly successful  conclusion, but 
consideration  of  agricultural  trade,  which  was  the  major 
preoccupation  of the  United  States,  was  deferred. 
Since  both  the  members  of  the  European  Community 
and  the  United  States  are  located  in  the  temperate  zone, 
it is an unfortunate fact that they grow essentially the same 
crops. Moreover, because of the political power of farming 
groups and the importance assigned  to agriculture on both 
continents, the price of agricultural commodities and hence 
the incomes  of farmers  are maintained  at artificially  high 
levels by a series of quotas, levies, and other restrictions on 
imports that partially isolate the internal market. The level 
of  protection  depends  on  the  efficiency  of  the  domestic 
producers:  while  American  prices  are  near  to  the  world 
levels,  those in Europe can  be fifty  to  seventy-five  percent 
higher,  reflecting  the  relatively  small  size  and  obsolete 
methods  typical  of  European  farming.  Although  one  of 
the  main  goals  of the  EEC's  common  agricultural  policy 
is  to  promote  the  modernization  and  rationalization  of 
European  agriculture,  its  principal  effect  so  far  has  been 
to guarantee high prices by means of a floating levy impos-
ed on all imports of products covered by CAP. Since these 
items are precisely  those grown in Europe and the  United 
States,  the  result  has  been  the  partial  exclusion  of  the 
cheaper  American  commodities  and,  in  some  cases,  the 
accumulation of unwanted surpluses. 
The  common  agricultural  policy  has  therefore  become 
one of the main targets  of American criticism. The United 
States  maintains  that  CAP  is  an  inherently  protectionist 
system  that  has  acted  to  preserve  an  inefficient  activity 
and to restrict the volume of American agricultural exports 
to Europe. Although the EEC emphasizes  that the amount 
of imports from  the United States has  grown  steadily and 
its percentage in terms  of total European consumption  has 
remained  constant,  it  is  clear  that  the  principal  benefits 
from expanding consumer  demand have gone to European 
producers.  In  addition,  the  subsidised  sale  of  surpluses 
abroad  has  provoked  repeated  criticism  from  Washington 
and some members of the Community.  Despite an attempt 
to  achieve agreement on agricultural trade in the Kennedy 
Round  of  GATT  negotiations,  the  common  agricultural 
policy  still  remains  a  sore  point  in  relations  between  the 
United States and the Community. 
Association agreements 
Whereas American opposition to the present common agri-
cultural policy, because of its protectionist elements, reflects 
the  $150-200  million  in  potential  exports  it  is  estimated 
to have cost the United States, criticism of the Community's 
policy of association with non-European countries is based 
much  more  on  fundamental  principles.  The  members  of 
the Common Market argue that the association agreements 
with  African states were necessary to prevent the economic 
disruption  of these  countries,  many of whom,  as  colonies, 
enjoyed preferential access  to  European markets,  and that 
they serve to channel aid from the EEC. The United States, 
however,  views  these  arrangements  as  fostering  regional 
trading blocs: by creating a system of reciprocal preferences, 
they  promote  the  development  of  exclusive  commercial 
ties  between  the  African  states  and  the  Common  Market 
members.  This  discriminates  not  only  against  the  United 
States  but also  against other countries producing the same 
items  as  the associated  states-the Latin American nations 
in particular, who in turn may be expected to put pressure 
on the  United States  to  construct its  own  regional  trading 
bloc in the western hemisphere. 
The United States  objects  to the association  agreements, 
therefore, because they are incompatible with a multilateral 
world  economy.  Although  it  is  dubious  of  the  value  of 
trade  preferences  in  providing  aid,  the  United  States  has 
indicated  its  willingness  to  accept  such  a  system,  provided 
that the  donor  abjures  any reciprocal  advantages and that 
the  benefits  are  extended  without  discrimination  to  all 
eligible  countries.  American  criticism  of  the  association agreements consequently is directed at the particular method 
chosen rather than the attempt to provide assistance.  Both 
the United States and Europe have in fact endorsed a global 
preference system, but pending its realisation, the European 
Community  has  refused  to  abandon  its  association  agree-
ments  and  is  concluding  new  ones  with  members  of  the 
British Commonwealth. The United States government has 
repeatedly  expressed  great  concern  about  these  develop-
ments,  as  it fears  they  may  lead  to  the  fragmentation  of 
the  world  economy. 
By  far  the  most  contested  set  of  issues  between  the 
United  States  and  the  European  Community  are  those 
concerning trade and monetary affairs. The American posi-
tions  on  these  topics  are  not  based  on  objections  to  the 
policies  of the  Common  Market or the  lines  along  which 
it is  developing,  as  in  the  case  of  the  disputes  over  the 
common agricultural policy and the association agreements; 
rather  the  differences  of  opinion  about  the  commercial 
relations  between  the  two  partners  resemble  traditional 
conflicts  among individual  states.  That the participants are 
the  United States  and the  EEC may  mean  that the stakes 
are  higher  and that solutions  are somewhat  more  urgent, 
but  essentially  the  negotiations  are  no  different  from 
normal diplomatic activity. 
The subjects  involved,  however,  are  extremely  complex: 
as the level of tariff barriers between the United States and 
the  EEC  has  been  reduced,  the  major  obstacles  to  trade 
have  become  "non-tariff  barriers",  such  as  national  regu-
lations,  procurement  policies,  and  valuation  procedures. 
Thus,  the  United States  has repeatedly  attacked protective 
devices  like  border  taxes,  while  the  Common  Market 
has long called for the elimination of the American Selling 
Price  system,  a  notorious  obstacle  to  foreign  chemical 
products. A  major part of trade negotiations  is,  therefore, 
devoted to considering NTBs,  but as  it is  very  difficult  to 
identify  such  impediments,  let alone quantify  their  effects, 
progress has been disappointingly slow. 
The  same  situation  predominates  in  monetary  affairs, 
where  the  need  for  fundamental  reform  is  accepted,  but 
consensus on how to proceed is  lacking. The United States 
wishes  to  introduce  considerable  flexibility  into  the  fixing 
of exchange rates and has asserted that trade and military 
issues  must  be  considered  simultaneously.  The  members 
of the EEC, in contrast, have insisted that the United States 
restore the convertibility of the dollar into gold and return 
to  a  system  of fixed  exchange  rates.  Although  the differ-
ences in position and the complex interrelationships between 
trade  and  monetary  matters  suggests  that  resolution  of 
these  issues  will  require  long  and  difficult  negotiations, 
the  importance  to  both Europe  and the  United States  of 
maintaining healthy  economic  relations  indicates  that tem-
porary  compromises  will  furnish  an  interim  solution  to 
these problems. 
Conclusion 
The  landmark  decisions  that  determined  the  course  of 
postwar  United  States  policy  towards  Europe  were  made 
in  the early  1940s,  and  thirty  years  later it is  these  same 
principles  that still  guide  American  action.  Europe is  still 
regarded  as  a  region  of  vital  importance  to  the  United 
States,  and  one  in  which  it is  necessary  that  the  United 
States play an active role. The United States believes today, 
as it did then, that a  strong and democratic Europe is  still 
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in  the  national  interest,  despite  the  changes  that  have 
occurred  in  the  international  political  environment.  In 
President Nixon's words: 
"America's  and  western  Europe's  interests  are  parallel 
in  most areas  of policy  .... The United  States  has  always 
supported  the  strengthening  and enlargement of the Euro-
pean  Community.  We  still  do.  We  welcome  cohesion  in 
Europe  because  it  makes  Europe  a  sturdier  pillar  of 
peace .... We  recognize  that our interests  will  necessarily 
be  affected  by  Europe's  evolution  and  we  may  have  to 
make  sacrifices  in  the  common  interest.  We  consider  that 
the  possible  economic  price  of a  truly  unified  Europe  is 
outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West 
as a whole." 4 
But  in  the  past  thirty  years  dramatic  changes  have 
occurred  in  Europe,  changes  to  which  the  policies  of the 
United States contributed. These altered circumstances have 
necessitated changes  in  American  policies as they  continue 
to  attempt  to  reach  the  same goal.  As  Europe has  grown 
in  economic  power,  the  United States  has encouraged her 
to  assume  the  responsibilities,  both  in  terms  of decisions 
and  commitments,  commensurate  with  this  development. 
"Twin  pillars",  "Atlantic  Partnership",  "Grand  Design", 
and most recently "Nixon Doctrine" symbolize the attempts 
of successive administrations to  persuade European nations 
that they had: 
"The ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes 
which once might have required our intervention .... [The] 
central  thesis  [was]  that the  United  States  will  participate 
in  the  defense  and  development  of allies  and friends,  but 
that America cannot-and will not-conceive all the plans, 
design  all  the  programs,  execute  all  the  decisions,  and 
undertake  all  the  defense  of  the  free  nations  of  the 
world." s 
The frustrations produced when Europe failed to respond 
has  engendered  a  sense  of disillusionment  with  Europe,  a 
feeling  that was  strengthened  by  the  lack  of progress  to-
wards  political  union.  To  the  more  cynical,  European 
integration  has  seemed  to  have  served  only  to  produce 
economic  benefits,  and  as  the  United  States  experienced 
increasing balance of payments difficulties,  it was  inevitable 
that Europe be held to  some extent responsible.  Now that 
the  Common Market has been established as a  going con-
cern,  the  United  States  has  become  increasingly  pre-occu-
pied  with  its  own  interests.  In some  sense,  this  may mark 
the  beginning  of normal  intergovernmental  relations,  with 
the  habitual conflicts  of national  interest,  but after almost 
two decades of commitment to the ideal of a united Europe 
and  of  identifying  European  interests  with  its  own,  this 
has  been  a  difficult  transition  for  the  United  States  to 
make.  The reevaluation  of its  policy  towards  Europe that 
the American government was  to conduct during the "Year 
of Europe" reflects  this perception that the interests of the 
United States and western  Europe are no  longer identical. 
But while it indicates that the American government believes 
that  the  changed  circumstances  in  Europe  necessitate  a 
re-examination  of  American  policy,  it  also  demonstrates 
that the United States believes that it still has a vital interest 
in,  crucial  ties  with,  and  an  essential  role  to  play  in 
western Europe. 
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Bretton Woods and After (2) 
lan  Davidson 
Part 2:  The system breaks down 
The international monetary system set up in 1944 represented a major step towards 
a  world  of greater  rationality  and  co-operativeness,  and  made  possible  a  period  of 
unprecedented  economic  prosperity.  Its  major  shortcoming  was  .the  assumption  that 
the  dollar  would  always  remain  the  world's  strongest  currency.  The  attempts  which 
were  made during  the middle and late  1960s  to  modify the  system did not go  far  or 
fast enough to prevent the major crisis which erupted in 1971, and still continues. 
The international monetary system created at Bretton 
Woods in the aftermath of the second World War was 
based  on two  principles.  The first  was  that the Inter-
national  Monetary  Fund  would  provide  convertible 
currencies to enable member countries to weather tem-
porary balance  of payments  difficulties  by  supporting 
their  currencies  in  the  foreign-exchange  markets  at 
pre-determined  rates.  The  second  was  that  all  cur-
rencies would be fixed in terms of the US dollar, while 
the dollar would be fixed  in terms of gold. 
What the  system  did not do was  to make adequate 
provision  for  the  future.  It failed  to  deal  with  the 
question of what would happen if the resources of the 
International Monetary Fund should prove inadequate, 
either  in  quality  or quantity,  to finance  the needs  of 
the world's monetary authorities. Much more seriously, 
it  failed  to  deal  with  the  question  of  what  would 
happen  if the  dollar  should  become  a  weak  currency 
and thus  cease to  be able to carry out its  function as 
the keystone of the new international monetary system. 
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The problem of the Fund's resources,  which is  part 
of what is known as the problem of international liqui-
dity,  was  at  first  fairly  easily  resolved.  In  1959  the 
members  of  the  IMF  increased  their  contributions 
(otherwise known as their quotas)  by 50  per cent, and 
in some cases  by larger amounts,  in order to keep  its 
resources  rising  in  line  with  the  expansion  of  inter-
national  trade.  Further  increases  were  also  made  in 
1966  (by a  quarter or more), as well  as in 1970  (by  a 
third or more), so that by that time the total subscrip-
tions  to  the  Fund  amounted  to  slightly  more  than 
$ 28,000  million. 
These increases  failed  to  keep  pace with  the  needs 
of at least  some  of  the  major  countries,  notably  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  Despite  the 
devaluation  of  1949,  the  UK  repeatedly  ran  into 
balance-of-payments  difficulties  during  most  of  the 
post-war  period  and  regularly  had  to  borrow  from 
the IMF on a very large scale. To make matters much 
worse, the United States also ran into serious balance-of-payments  difficulties  in  the  early  1960s,  and  never 
succeeded  in  escaping  from  them. 
In theory, the British difficulties  were  not as  serious 
as  those  of the  US,  since  the  pound did  not have as 
central a position as the dollar. Nevertheless, the pound 
itself was the centre of a major international payments 
system, known as the sterling area, which largely over-
lapped with  the Commonwealth.  These  countries  kept 
most of their reserves in sterling rather than in dollars, 
and,  because  of  the  economic  importance  of  the 
sterling  area  to  the  world's  trade,  it was  widely  felt 
(mostly  in  Britain,  but also  in  other countries)  that a 
particular effort should be made to support the pound 
in its difficulties. 
Modifications of the Fund 
It was largely for this reason, therefore, that in 1962 
ten of the leading members  of the Fund introduced a 
significant  modification  in  the  methods  of  financing 
the  Fund.  (This  so-called  Group of Ten included  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Japan, 
Sweden and the five  biggest members of the Common 
Market.) Under the General Arrangements to Borrow, 
the  Ten  agreed  to  set  up  a  new  stand-by  credit  of 
$6,000 million, which  they  would be prepared to lend 
to  the  Fund  in  case  it  needed  additional  resources. 
The  immediate  reason  for  this  departure  from  the 
normal practice of making paid-up subscriptions to the 
Fund was  that in  1961  Britain  (together  with  certain 
less  developed  countries)  had  drawn  heavily  on  the 
IMF, and had thus  seriously  run down  its  supply  of 
usable  currencies.  (All  countries  put  currency  into 
the  IMF;  but  only  a  few  currencies-those  of  the 
major industrial  nations-are really  useful for  settling 
international  debts;  e.g.  the  Brazilian  cruzeiro  is  not 
as acceptable as the German mark.) 
But  the underlying  reason for setting up the Group 
of Ten  was  that,  while  the  European countries  (who 
were  all  running  a  surplus  on  their  balance-of-pay-
ments)  were  ready  if  somewhat  reluctantly,  to  help 
the UK, they  were  not ready  to  sign  a  blank cheque 
by  endorsing  a  new  increase  in  the  Fund's  quotas. 
Drawings from the Fund take place  on a  quasi-auto-
matic  basis,  over  which  the  member  states  have  little 
or no control.  But the $ 6,000  million  stand-by  credit 
would  only  be  made  available  as  and  when  the  rich 
creditor  countries  agreed.  The  General  Arrangements 
to Borrow thus institutionalised an inner group of the 
members  of the  International  Monetary  Fund,  which 
was  to  remain  for  the  next  ten  years  the  principal 
forum  for  all  negotiations  on  international  monetary 
questions. 
These  institutionalised  mechanisms  for  supplement-
ing  the  world's  liquidity  were  difficult  and  slow  to 
negotiate and set up. The General Arrangements to Bor-
row  were  less  trouble  than  across-the-board  increases 
in the Fund quotas of all IMF members,  just because 
fewer countries were involved,  but it was  not an easy 
process  even  so.  In parallel  with  these  formal  multi-
lateral  arrangements,  therefore,  many  of  the  major 
central banks entered into private, bilateral agreements 
with  other  central  banks,  under  which  each  of them 
could  borrow  each  other's  currency  up  to  an  agreed 
ceiling  for  short  (i.e.  three-month)  periods.  Strictly 
speaking, these borrowings take the form of exchanges 
of currency,  on the lines of drawings  from  the IMF, 
and thus are known as swaps. 
Because  of  its  balance-of-payments  difficulties,  the 
United  States  was  far  the  most  active  in  developing 
the swap  system,  and during the early  1960s  it set up 
a complete network of them with most of the European 
creditor  countries,  and  progressively  persuaded  them 
to expand the volume of short-term credit it could draw 
upon. 
Despite their name, swaps were essentially one-sided 
in intention,  since they were  designed  to prop up the 
dollar  through  what was  felt  initially  to  be  a  period 
of temporary difficulty,  but the Europeans felt obliged 
to help.  Under the IMF rules, the dollar was  the key-
stone of the world's monetary system and the US was 
by  far the  most important economy.  Political  consid-
erations seemed  to  be even more important:  the Cold 
War between west and east was still erupting, with the 
Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile  crisis,  and the  US 
was felt to be the main bastion of Europe's defence. 
For  these  reasons  most  European  countries  were 
sympathetic  to  the  Americans  when  they  demanded 
more  far-reaching  measures  to  expand  international 
liquidity. They recognised the self-interest of the Amer-
icans, who wanted the creation of additional quantities 
of  international  reserve  assets  in  order  to  make  it 
easier  for  them  to finance  their  deficit;  but they  also 
recognised  that the  total  volume  of the  world's  gold 
and  foreign  exchange  was  growing  more slowly  than 
world trade, and that, if there was not already a short-
age  of  world  liquidity,  such  a  shortage  might  well 
emerge and would then act as a brake on the develop-
ment of world trade and on economic growth. 
The  only  major  exception  was  France.  General de 
Gaulle  bitterly  resented  America's  privileged  position 
in the world and relentlessly opposed any step to make 
life  easier for  Washington  in its  'temporary'  balance-
of-payments difficulties. He attacked the Americans for 
fighting  the war in Vietnam and for  buying up Euro-
pean companies,  both of which bore a  large responsi-
bility  for  the  American  balance-of-payments  deficit. 
He argued  that the  real  problem  was  not a  shortage 
of liquidity, but a glut of it in the shape of the outflow 
of dollars  from  the  US,  and throughout most of the 
1960s  he  rigorously  opposed  American  demands  for 
the creation of a new type of reserve asset. 
Special Drawing Rights 
The Americans  nevertheless  pursued  their  demands 
relentlessly,  and  the  negotiations  dragged  their  way 
laboriously forward from 1962  until a  final  agreement 
was reached, in 1969, on the establishment of a wholly 
new, international reserve asset called Special Drawing 
Rights.  By  1967,  most of the  members of the Group 
of Ten were convinced that some new  mechanism for 
creating international liquidity  was  needed,  to supple-
ment the very  slow growth in the word's gold supply, 
and  to  offset  the  shortage  which  would  occur  when 
(or  if)  the  US  ended  its  balance-of-payments  deficit. 
In  1968  nine  of them  overcame  the  strong  objections 
of the French, and adopted the Special Drawing Rights 
scheme. And in 1969 it was agreed that $9,500 million 
worth of these new Special Drawing Rights should be 
distributed in three annual slices to all the members of 
the  IMF:  $3,500  million  in  1970  and  $3,000 million 
in each of the following two years. The most important fact about this  new  instrument 
was  that it was  an entirely artificial,  man-made  asset, 
created solely on paper as a result of a collective deci-
sion  of sovereign  governments. It was  not backed  by 
gold or any other asset (though it was defined in terms 
of gold), and it did not depend on any national contri-
bution to the Fund in gold or foreign exchange. In this 
respect  it  was  comparable  to  national  bank  notes, 
whose value is purely a matter of confidence or general 
acceptability.  Indeed,  SDRs  are  even  more  intangible 
than  bank  notes,  since  they  only  exist  as  a  series  of 
book-keeping entries in the ledgers of the IMF and of 
the central banks of the member states. 
As  such,  SDRs  cannot  be  used  by  a  central  bank 
that holds them:  they  only  represent an entitlement to 
gold  or foreign  exchange,  which can then be used  for 
normal  international  transactions.  If  a  government 
wants to draw on its SDRs, it says so to the managing 
director of the Fund. He will then designate a country 
which has large foreign  exchange reserves, or a  strong 
balance  of  payments  surplus;  this  country  is  then 
obliged to swap some of its foreign exchange for SDRs. 
There  are  limits  on the  use  of SDRs,  however.  A 
country  may  only  use  on average  70  per cent of its 
allocation, and if it goes  over this limit temporarily, it 
must subsequently  buy  back some SDRs with foreign 
currency. A surplus country can go on accepting SDRs 
without  limit  if it wants  to;  but it  is  not obliged  to 
accept  SDRs  once  its  holdings  reach  three  times  its 
original allocation. 
The creation of SDRs represented  a  major advance 
in the  rational management  of the  international mon-
etary  system,  at least  as  significant  in  its  way  as  the 
original  Bretton Woods  charter. For the  first  time  the 
governments  of the world  had created  what amounts 
to  an  international  currency,  which  was  quite  inde-
pendent of any national currency and quite independent 
of any supplies  of gold.  For the first  time,  therefore, 
they  were  in a  position where they  could  decide  how 
much international liquidity should be created, without 
having to depend on the costs of mining goW, let alone 
on chance fluctuations in the  balances of payments of 
the  major  reserve  countries,  such  as  Britain  and  the 
United States. 
Monetary Crises 
The  Special  Drawing  Rights  agreement  did  not, 
however,  prevent  the  worst  international  monetary 
crisis in the post-war period. It  started in 1967 and 1968, 
after the devaluation of sterling and the  May Revolu-
tion  in France, with waves  of unprecedented  specula-
tion against the pound and the franc and in favour of 
gold  and  the  German  Mark.  The  British  and French 
currencies were both regarded as weak and liable to be 
devalued  while  Germany  was  earning  enormous 
balance-of-payments  surpluses  and  its  currency  was 
expected to be raised in value. 
By  1970 and 1971, however, it was increasingly clear 
that the strength of the German mark was  at bottom 
the reflection of the weakness of the dollar. Throughout 
the  1960s  the  American  government  had  repeatedly 
promised  the European governments  that its  balance-
of-payments  problems  would  soon  be  eliminated;  but 
by the end of the decade it was evident that the long-
promised  improvement  was  further  off  than  ever.  In 
1970  the  official  settlements  deficit  reached  nearly 
3 
$ 10,000  million,  and  in  the  following  year  it soared 
to nearly $ 30,000 million. A large part of this dramatic 
deterioration was due to the costs of the Vietnam war 
and to  capital spending abroad;  but for the  first  time 
in post-war history the US imported more goods than 
it  exported  (leading  to  a  trade  deficit  of  nearly 
$ 3,000  million), as a  result of inflation  and rising  do-
mestic  costs  together  with  a  very  rapid  increase  in 
exports by Japan. 
Drastic steps were called for, and on August 15, 1971, 
President Nixon announced a  far-reaching package of 
balance-of-payments  measures.  It included  a  10  per 
cent increase in the import duty on manufactured goods 
and special tax concessions to  exporters. But the most 
significant item, from a political as well as a monetary 
point of view,  was  the suspension of the convertibility 
of dollars into gold. 
Dollar Convertibility 
The  reason  for  the  move  was  simple  enough.  The 
American  balance-of-payments  deficit  had  poured  a 
vast  glut  of  dollars  into  the  hands  of  the  creditor 
countries, notably Japan and European countries. Some 
of these  dollars  had  been  presented  to  the  American 
authorities  for  conversion  into  gold,  and  as  a  result 
the US gold stock had fallen to around $ 10,000 million. 
But  the  accumulation  of  dollars  in  foreign  central 
banks,  which  the  Americans  had persuaded  them  not 
to convert 'for the sake of the stability of the system', 
was  five  times  as  big,  and  amounted  to  some 
$ 50,000  million. Clearly the US  could not convert all 
these  dollars  into  gold;  equally  clearly,  the  foreign 
central banks would not agree to go on piling up uncon-
vertible  dollars  indefinitely.  Indeed,  the  suspension  of 
convertibility  was  triggered  off  by  a  British  demand 
for an American gold  guarantee for its surplus dollar 
holdings. 
In May of 1971, the German government had moved 
to  keep  out  the  flood  of  surplus  dollars  by  ceasing 
to support the dollar in order to keep the mark at its 
official  dollar parity in the foreign  exchange  markets; 
when the mark was no longer held down, it gradually 
floated  up.  In August, after President Nixon's announ-
cement,  virtually all countries suspended their parities, 
and allowed their currencies to float more or less freely 
upwards  against  the  dollar.  (Once  again,  the  French 
were a significant exception, since they refused to con-
template any deterioration in the price of their currency 
in  order  to  help  the  Americans  solve  their  balance-
of-payments  problem.  They  therefore  maintained  the 
official  rate  of the  franc  against  the  dollar  for  trade 
transactions, though they  allowed some upward move-
ment in francs  used  for  purely financial  transactions.) 
The  next  four  months  were  occupied  with  heavy 
international bargaining. Each of the creditor countries 
was determined to preserve its own balance-of-payments 
surplus as far as possible, and was therefore determined 
to minimise the amount by  which  it would revalue its 
currency in any new realignment of parities; each coun-
try was anxious to push on to its neighbour the conces-
sions  necessary to enable the US  to right its balance-
of-payments  deficit.  Inevitably  Japan  and  Germany 
were regarded as candidates for the biggest revaluations, 
since  they  had  the  largest  balance-of-payments  sur-
pluses.  Britain,  too,  had  a  very  large  surplus,  partly 
because of the economic recession and the low demand for  imports;  but  it  was  expected  to  disappear  once 
expansion  started  again,  and  more  particularly  after 
the  country  started  having  to  bear  the  costs  of  the 
common agricultural policy inside the Common Market. 
For a  number  of countries,  especially  those  on the 
continent of Europe  (led  by  the  French),  no  bargain 
was  possible  on a  realignment of exchange  rates until 
the US agreed to an increase in the price of gold. This 
had  long  been  considered  difficult,  if  not  actually 
impossible,  because  Congress  would  be  required  to 
approve  any  increase,  and  the  official  gold  price  of 
$35 an ounce,  which  had been in  force  for  37  years, 
was widely regarded in America as proof that the dollar 
was  'as good  as  gold'.  Once it could  be seen  that the 
price  was  not immutable,  the  gold-dollar  equivalence 
would no longer seem valid. 
It soon  became  apparent,  however,  that the  official 
price of gold was little more than a convenient fiction. 
The US would not in fact  be in a  position to convert 
foreign dollar holdings into gold unless the price were 
multiplied by  five  to $ 175  an ounce, and no-one con-
templated  any  such  dramatic  increase;  for  one  thing 
it  would  have  given  a  completely  disproportionate 
advantage  to  gold-producing  countries  like  South 
Africa and the Soviet Union, as well as to gold-hoard-
ing  countries  like  France;  for  another  it would  have 
given  gold  a  new  importance  in  the  international 
monetary  system,  which  was  favoured  by  very  few 
countries  apart  from  South  Africa  and  Switzerland. 
The  sort of symbolic  increase  being  discussed  during 
the autumn of 1971  was  only of the  order of 10  per 
cent,  which  was,  as  some  people  put it at the  time, 
the  price  at which  the  US  would  continue  to  refuse 
to  sell  gold.  In  the  circumstances,  any  change  was 
irrational;  but  some  increase  was  required  by  the 
Europeans,  to  show  that  the  dollar  could  no  longer 
remain  the  keystone  of  the  international  monetary 
system. 
On December 18, 1971  the haggling was over. The US 
agreed to raise the price of gold by 8.57  per cent, and 
all  other  surplus  countries  agreed  to  revalue  against 
the dollar:  Japan by  nearly  17  per cent,  Germany by 
nearly  14  per  cent,  and  other  countries  by  smaller 
amounts.  It was  also  agreed  that negotiations  should 
take place on a fundamental reform of the international 
monetary system;  and that,  in the  meantime,  the per-
mitted fluctuation  of individual  currencies  against  the 
dollar  would  be widened  from  1  to  2 t  per  cent  on 
either side of a "central" rate, in order to allow greater 
freedom of manreuvre in this  new,  and very uncertain 
situation. 
A  number  of important  lessons  emerged  from  the 
1971  monetary crisis and its provisional resolution. The 
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first was  that no country was  at that time prepared to 
embark  on a  major trade war in order to protect its 
balance of payments or its exchange rate. The second 
was  that  the  US  dollar  could  not remain  indefinitely 
the  standard  of  value  in  the  international  monetary 
system, if it remained in chronic over-supply as a result 
of the US deficit; no-one doubted that the dollar would 
remain  the  world's  most  important  currency  for  the 
foreseeable future, because of the size of the American 
economy-but that was  not the same thing.  The third 
was  that the  world's  major trading  nations  had prog-
ressed  far  enough  in  the  joint  management  of  the 
international  monetary  system,  and  had  so  much  to 
lose  from  any return to  anarchy,  that they  were  able 
to  negotiate  a  simultaneous  realignment  of  their 
exchange  rates;  no-one  could  be  sure  that  the  new 
rates would prove ideal or durable-hence the widening 
of the  margins  of fluctuation-but any  agreement  on 
a  new  international pattern was  a  major achievement 
of the negotiation  process.  The fourth lesson was that 
some new rules would be necessary in future to prevent 
a  recurrence of a  similar crisis. 
What these new rules should be is obscure. But many 
countries, including Britain and the six members of the 
European  Community  believed  that  the  international 
monetary system should in future be based on Special 
Drawing Rights as  the central reserve asset and stand-
ard of value,  and not on dollars.  Hitherto  the  dollar 
had occupied a  unique position, since  it had been (in 
theory  if  not  in  practice)  the  only  currency  to  be 
convertible  into  gold;  henceforward,  they  argued,  the 
dollar should  have  exactly  the  same  functions  as  any 
other currency. 
Many obstacles would have to be surmounted before 
such a transformation could take place. For one thing, 
the  dollar is  by  far  the  most  important reserve  asset, 
and  it  would  be  difficult  to  replace  it by  SDRs and 
to find some way in which the US could buy back these 
dollars;  for  another,  SDRs  are  a  very  new  type  of 
asset whose value depends solely on the faith of central 
banks.  But  if such  a  reform  could  be  negotiated,  it 
would represent a step forward in the rational manage-
ment of the world's monetary affairs besides which the 
Bretton Woods charter would pale into insignificance. 
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Worker participation 
in the European Community 
Developments in  the Original  Six 
In  1948,  the  German  industrialist  A/fried Krupp  von  Bohlen  und  Halbach  was 
sentenced  to  twelve  years  in  jail  for  employing  concentration  camp  inmates  and 
prisoners-of-war in the gigantic Ruhr coal and steel empire  which bore,  and still bears, 
the family name. 
As for  the company itself, Krupps,  along  with  other lesser  fiefdoms in  the  heavy 
industrial sector, was to be broken up and dispersed: never again,  it was agreed,  should 
control over so  large  and basic a sector of the  German  economy  be  vested in so  few 
people. 
This  view  commended  itself  particularly  strongly  to  the  reconstituted  German 
trade union movement, itself one of the principal casualties of the Nazi regime. Accord-
ingly, it put forward  to  the occupying powers a scheme for  Mitbestimmung-co-deter-
mination by  a firm's  workers-to prevent a company's power from  being abused  for 
political  ends.  And so,  when  new  management  boards  were  appointed  for  the  dis-
membered  industrial  trusts  of  the  Ruhr,  the  military  administration  divided  their 
members equally  between employers'  and workers'  representatives. 
Thus was the modern practice of "participation"  born. 
Had  the  authorities  who  officiated  so  benevolently 
at the birth foreseen that it would become a most con-
tentious  issue  in  Western  industrial  relations  for  the 
next  quarter,  probably  half,  a  century,  they  might 
well  have  pondered  rather  longer  before  giving  their 
blessing. 
A  veto  at this  stage could  not have  suppressed  the 
idea  for  long  however;  for  though  the  motive  force 
behind  the  first  Mitbestimmung  demand  was  broadly 
and urgently political, the other main impulse is  being 
provided all the time by the simple logic  of industrial 
development. 
Factories and companies (and trade unions, for that 
matter)  are  getting  bigger  and  bigger.  They  merge. 
They are taken over. They are hived off and rationalis-
ed.  Workers and their jobs  are, in effect,  bought and 
sold  with  the capital machinery.  Manufacturing proc-
esses are broken down into the tiniest component parts 
and then timed with a stop-watch, so that a car-worker, 
for  example,  doesn't  make  a  car:  he  spends  his  day 
bolting one small part on another small part, over and 
over and over again, so many point something seconds 
a  time,  on  a  moving  assembly  line.  A  report in The 
Times  (16  March  1972)  on  an  American  car  plant 
noted:  "The  main  complaint  of the  workers  is  that 
1 
they  are  treated  like  machines  not people.  (  ...  )  They 
want more interesting, more responsible work. At pre-
sent, they feel  a strong sense of alienation, of no pride 
whatever in what they are doing." 
They are demanding a  say in the way their jobs are 
organised  and in  the  decisions  which  affect  them.  A 
form of participation, in fact. 
The idea is  currently making  considerable headway 
in the EEC, where the German Mitbestimmung system 
has exerted a lot of influence. Just how far the original 
Six have moved from the doctrine of pure managerial 
prerogative-"I'm the boss and whatever I say goes"-
to genuine employee involvement in decision-making is 
illustrated by the following  survey. 
Germany 
The starting point is  Germany,  the  home  of it  all, 
where  the keystone  of the  participation  edifice  is  the 
law  of  21  May  1951,  which  lays  down  the  famous 
Mitbestimmung principle for the country's mining and 
steel  enterprises.  Unter  the  terms  of  the  Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz, every coal and steel company with more than  1000  workers must have  a  "supervisory  board" 
normally composed of 11  members, five of them elected 
by the shareholders, five  to represent the workers, and 
one identifiable with neither side but acceptable to both. 
The unions (as  opposed to the workers-an important 
distinction)  have  secured  their  position  in  the  system 
through  their  role  in  the  selection  of the board's five 
worker representatives:  three of them are direct union 
appointments  (one  of whom at least must come from 
outside the company), whilst the other two are elected 
by  the  employees  in  agreement  with  the  union  in 
question.  Under  this  two-tier  system,  the  supervisory 
board  has  "hire  and  fire"  authority  over  a  second, 
smaller  board responsible  for  the  day to day  running 
of the business. In the companies covered by the Mit-
bestimmungsgesetz,  this  board must include a  director 
with special responsibility for personal questions, whose 
appointment or dismissal can be vetoed by the workers' 
representatives on the supervisory board. 
In industries  other  than  coal  and  steel,  companies 
are subject to the 1952 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (works 
constitution law),  which  allots  only  a  minority-one-
third-of supervisory  board seats  to workers. 
The Betriebsverfassungsgesetz also governs the oper-
ations  of the  works  councils,  which  form  the  second 
main prop of the system. Playing in general a watchdog 
role,  their  working  has  not always  been  satisfactory, 
especially in the ordinary one-third representation sys-
tem applicable  to most of industry.  Two of the most 
frequent criticisms are that the councils, being company 
rather than union bodies, tend to by-pass the organised 
labour  movement  and  consequently  lack  the  latter's 
strength and cohesion;  and that whilst in the full  Mit-
bestimmung system  the  council  has  a  direct  manage-
ment  opposite  number  to  talk  to  in  the  personnel 
director,  this  is  not  the  case  elsewhere.  The result  is 
very  often  not the  desired  concertation  and compro-
mise,  but  friction.  Going  some  (though  not  all)  the 
way  to  meet  these  union  objections,  Willy  Brandt's 
government of Social  Democrats and Free Democrats 
recently put on the statute books a law greatly reinforc-
ing  works  council  powers  and  increasing  the  union 
presence within them.  In particular, it gives  the works 
council  authority  to  veto  dismissals,  subject to media-
tion and then decision by the labour courts, and hands 
them wide-ranging powers over manpower policy, train-
ing,  health,  company  housing  and  payment  systems. 
It is still too early to pass judgement on these reforms; 
but it is  fair to say that whilst the unions would prefer 
even  more  radical  measures,  particularly  in  the  eco-
nomic field,  German employers are frankly appalled at 
what  they  see  as  a  severe  threat  to  the  free  market 
economy. 
This is also the critics' view of the unions' longstand-
ing claims  for  the extension  of the full "co-determin-
ation" system to all industrial concerns above a certain 
size  (about  500  companies  would  be  affected  under 
the union criteria). They argue that Mitbestimmung is 
time-wasting,  results  in  overcautious  policies  and 
requires from the personnel director the impossible task 
of representing at one and the same time  both work-
force  and management. 
They would appear nevertheless to be fighting  a los-
ing  battle:  with  practicable  schemes  tabled  by  both 
the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Christian  Democrat 
opposition,  extended  co-determination  seems  only  a 
matter of time. 
France 
From one extreme to the other:  in France, only the 
government, echoing De Gaulle's phrase about finding 
a  "middle  way  between  capitalism  and  communism", 
seems  to  have  much  interest  in  participation,  both 
unions  and  employers  rejecting  the  notion  for  one 
reason  or  another,  and  its  achievements  have  so  far 
been  small. 
The main reason no doubt lies in the still very com-
bative nature of French industrial relations. In France, 
as  almost  nowhere else  in Europe, employers cling to 
their  old  managerial  prerogatives  and unions  to  their 
class-warfare. It was not until the "evenements de mai" 
in  1968  that  unions  were  guaranteed  the  elementary 
right  to  form  branches  and  carry  on  normal  union 
activities inside the factory precincts. Some communic-
ations do exist. Staff representatives and works councils 
have existed on a  legal  basis since  1945  and 1946,  but 
with  such limited consultation functions that they can 
hardly  count  as  organs  of  participation.  There  are 
safety  and hygiene committees.  And some workers  sit 
on the boards of public sector industry. 
But the  only  real French claim to originality in the 
field lies in the law on financial participation reactivated 
in 1967, according to which profit-sharing is compulsory 
in firms  with more than  100  workers.  This law comes 
in  for  particular scorn  from  the  French trade union!., 
who see  in it an attempt to buy their co-operation fm 
worthless  currency  (perhaps  the most  effective  of tht-
Paris  wall  posters  in  May  1968  was  a  simple  whitt. 
sheet bearing the words  "Je participe,  tu participes,  il 
participe,  nous  participons,  vous  participez,  ils  pro-
fitent"):  how  they  say,  can  you  have  "participation" 
where trade union rights are not fully  guaranteed and 
where  many  employers  are  still  hostile  to  the  very 
concept of trade unionism? 
Italy 
Like  the  French  labour  movement,  Italian  trade 
unions refuse responsibility with managements for run-
ning capitalist enterprises because they want to change 
the  whole  basis  of society.  Not that employers would 
accept  them  as  partners  anyway:  the  notion  of  the 
factory  as  the  inviolable  personaL  property  of  the 
entrepreneur still holds strong sway south of the Alps. 
What  the  unions  do  demand,  though,  is  a  say  in 
working  conditions  and  the  planning  of  production 
methods, with equivalent influence over national polit-
ical  decisions  in the  social  field.  Interestingly  enough, 
Italian  unions  have  made  more  collective  impression 
in the political sphere than in the factories:  large scale 
action  undertaken  jointly  by  all  three  of  the  major 
trade  union  federations  has  over  the  last  couple  of 
years  secured important housing and pension reforms, 
for  example.  And  such  is  the  ineffectiveness  of  the 
present parties  that this political participation is  liable 
to increase as the unions are drawn into the vacuum. 
In the  plant,  Article  46  of  the  Italian  constitution 
guarantees "the right of workers to collaborate, accord-
ing  to  the  means  and within the limits  laid  down  by 
the law, in the running of enterprises"; industrial real-ities,  however,  have  seldom  lived  up  to  these  brave 
words. It is only since the "hot autumn" of 1970, and 
even  then  only  in  the  most  advanced  sectors,  that a 
union presence in the plant has begun  to  be tolerated 
at all. 
Italian  employers  would  much  prefer  to  deal  with 
the "insiders" of the commissioni interne, the equivalent 
of other countries' works councils, than the "outsiders" 
of  the  trade  unions,  and  as  in  other  countries,  the 
relationship  of unions  to  the commissioni is  currently 
a  major bone  of industrial contention.  Elected  by  all 
the  workers  of an  enterprise,  trade  unionists  or not, 
these  bodies  used  to  play  a  significant  role  in plant 
negotiations;  hostility  and  considerable  pressure  from 
the trade  unions have  now  reduced  their functions  in 
the main to  administering social  welfare  and policing 
agreements. 
Belgium 
The  third  of  the  anti-participation  countries  is 
Belgium.  Here  again,  though,  the  rejection  by  the 
unions  of participation  as  a  form  of integration into 
the capitalist system  conceals  a  demand which in fact 
takes the idea of worker involvement in industry to its 
ultimate  extreme:  workers'  control,  which  is  the  aim 
of the  powerful  Belgian  socialist  trade  union  federa-
tion  FGTB  (the  still  stronger  Christian  trade  unions 
are  just  as  militant).  Workers'  control,  as  the  FGTB 
sees  it,  is  a  step  towards  self-management-a concept 
dear  also  to  some  of the  French  unions-and would 
give  labour  the  right  of  veto  and  counterproposal 
before  economic  decisions  are  made.  Through  a  co-
ordinated  system  of  union  representation  at regional 
and national level as well as plant level, workers' con-
trol would gradually shift the emphasis of industrial life 
from  profits  at all  cost  to  social  justice  and  the will 
of the majority. 
Though employers  are no more  impressed  with  the 
idea of workers  on their boards  of management than 
the unions themselves,  contacts  between  the state and 
the  two  sides  of industrry  do  occur.  In fact,  from  a 
national  labour  council,  a  consumer  council,  and  a 
central  economic  council,  through  the  commissions 
paritaires-joint negotiating boards-which cover most 
sectors  of  industry  down  to  works  councils  and  a 
guaranteed place in the plant for a union representative, 
Belgium possesses all the potential organs of participa-
tion,  and through  them  the  unions  have  considerable 
influence  over  the  economy.  Participation,  one  might 
say, in all but name. 
The Netherlands 
Here participation by  both employers' and workers' 
organisations in the running of the economy has, until 
recently,  been  much  more  extensive.  Institutionalised 
consultation  between  the  state and Holland's pluralist 
professional organisations (both unions and employers 
have separate socialist, catholic and protestant organi-
sations) has become a  fact of life.  But in  the last few 
years, the unions especially have become more militant. 
Demanding  less  state  intervention  in  the  movement 
of wages,  they are now pressing for legislation  to  im-
prove  their  position  in  the  factories  which,  on  their 
own  admission,  they  have  somewhat  neglected  in  the 
past in favour of broader national considerations. 
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This  pressure had tangible  results  in  1971  with  the 
passage of two new laws. The first reinforces an earlier 
and ineffective  act on works  councils.  Under the new 
provisions, works councils, obligatory in all firms  with 
more  than  100  employees,  get  considerably  more 
powers:  they  have  to  be  consulted  on  certain  major 
issues like plant closures, mergers, manpower and pro-
motion policies  and important organisational changes, 
and their agreement is  necessary on matters concerning 
safety  and health, profit-sharing and pension schemes. 
This  power is  offset  to  some  extent  by  the  fact  that 
the  council chairman is  the firm's  managing director; 
but the change is  nonetheless important. 
The second law institutes a  supervisory board along 
German  lines  with  authority  to  appoint  and  dismiss 
the  directors.  Candidates  for  the  board  can  be  put 
forward by the board itself, shareholders, management 
and  works  council,  the  latter  two  groups  having  in 
certain circumstances the right of veto. The law applies 
to  roughly  750  large  companies  with  a  capital  of 
10 million florin ($ 2.5 m) or over and will cover about 
half  the  Netherlands'  industrial  workers.  It does  not, 
on  the  other  hand,  apply  to  subsidiaries  set  up  in 
Holland  by  foreign  firms  or  to  Dutch  companies 
employing  more  workers  outside  than  inside  the 
country. 
Whilst immediate employer reactions naturally vary, 
most  accept  that  participation  in  some  form  had  to 
come.  Many suspect,  probably  rightly,  that the  trend 
has  still  further  to  go  before  the  unions  are  fully 
satisfied. 
Luxembourg 
In the Grand Duchy, legislation  on participation  is 
still  being  considered.  It is  expected  shortly,  and will 
probably be based on a union programme drawn up as 
far  back  as  1967-though  the  union  proposals  are 
unlikely to appear in it in full. 
What the unions want is  a system of works councils, 
set  up  on  a  parity  basis  between  management  and 
workers  in  companies  with  more  than  250  workers, 
coupled in big firms  employing over 1000  people with 
a supervisory board including union representation. 
The  works  councils  would  lay  down  principles  of 
personnel policy-staff engagement, promotion, dismissal 
and  transfer.  They  would  have  a  say  in  production, 
sales and investment decisions and be kept fully  up to 
date on the firm's  financial  position. 
Participation on a European level 
Pressure for more worker representation in the coun-
cils  of industry  has  also  come  to  the  surface  at the 
western  European  level,  where  a  upified  system  of 
company law  is  being devised  by  the European Com-
munity to encourage industrial regrouping over national 
borders.  The European Commission  has  suggested,  to 
the dislike of the employers,  that the model European 
company should  roughly  follow  the  German arrange-
ment,  with a  supervisory  board allowing  workers  one 
seat  for  every  two  held  by  the  shareholders.  At the same time, there would be a central works council with 
members drawn from all the company plants and veto 
authority over personnel and wage systems. 
This  arrangement,  too  extreme  for  the  employers, 
does  not  go  as  far  as  some  people  would  like.  The 
largest European labour grouping, the European Confe-
deration of Free Trade Unions in the Community, for 
example,  suggested  that  the  new  supervisory  board 
should  give  the  shareholders  one-third  of  the  seats, 
like  the unions,  with the  final  third filled  by  neutrals. 
(Even this was less than perfect for the Germans, who 
were  unhappy  about  settling  for  less  at  Community 
level than they had already achieved at home.) 
Strangely,  it  is  the  unions'  rather  than  the  Com-
missions' proposals which are getting the first trial run, 
the  German  and  Dutch  steel  firms  Roesch  and 
Hoogovens  having  this  year  agreed  under  pressure  to 
adopt the ECFTU model for the supervisory board of 
their merged company. 
This practical breakthrough will  certainly strengthen 
the unions' hand in pressing for similar agreements in 
future international mergers. 
Conclusion 
The participation  issue  in  Europe  tends  to be con-
fused  but  nobody  would  deny  that  in  all  countries, 
even where unions (and certainly employers)  reject the 
idea, organised labour is  increasingly seeking to extend 
its  influence  over  decision-making  both  at  plant  and 
national level,  either by  obliging  employers  to  extend 
the  scope  of  collective  bargaining  or  by  obliging 
governments to undertake legislation. 
In one country this  is  labelled participation;  does  it 
cease  to  be  participation  in  another  just  because  the 
unions say it isn't? 
The Belgian FGTB declares (a bit provocatively) that 
"the choice  is  between  participation ... to  promote  a 
change in the system ... and participation which would 
subordinate union autonomy to the needs of the ruling 
class."  In  practice,  the  main  difference  seems  to  be 
whether  or  not  to  push  for  workers  on  company 
boards. Interestingly, those against-the unions in Italy, 
Belgium and France-can still  strike with impunity as 
a means of problem-solving; participation's protagonists 
in the other countries are legally restricted in their use 
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of the  strike weapon  and argue  that since  the  board-
room is  the  scene  of so  many decisions  affecting  the 
workforce, it would be folly  to pass  up the chance of 
being present. At the same time, they are as committed 
to the taming of capitalism as anyone else,  and would 
hotly dispute the idea that their chosen form of parti-
cipation served the needs of the big industrialists better 
than their own. 
Further  extending  the  scope,  already  immense,  of 
this  one  controversial  word  is  the  employers'  counter 
to works council and worker-director power. Job moti-
vation  and  enrichment  techniques  are  still  in  their 
infancy and no one country has a monopoly of them; 
but who is  to say that abolishing the rigidity of assem-
bly  lines  and  giving  groups  of workpeople  extensive 
autonomy  to  organise  themselves  as  they  wish  to 
accomplish  a  given  task  is  not participation?  Indeed, 
if a  recent German survey  of attitudes  to  Mitbestim-
mung is  to be believed, it may well turn out to be the 
most important form of all for the ordinary worker. 
Better  education  and  communications  mean  more 
aware and more articulate people. This is as relevant in 
industrial  as  in social  affairs,  and has  particular rele-
vance  to  the  highly  developed  societies  of  the  EEC. 
Moreover, claims made and satisfied in one country are 
quickly used as precedents in another; the trend is self-
reinforcing. Whatever the final mix of state intervention, 
employer  initiated  job-enrichment  programmes  and 
union representation in company decision-making, par-
ticipation seems here to stay and a Europe aiming to be 
more  than  just  an  economic  entity  should  not  only 
recognise but welcome the fact. 
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